Colonial Roots

Although the current conflict might appear, on the surface, as one between two superpowers in their own right, it is important not to forget just how important Britain’s colonial legacy in the region was to shaping the disputes which have followed. Despite the British departure from South Asia over half a century ago, and the age of ‘post-colonialism’ that ostensibly came with it, the legacies of British rule still hold an influence over the contemporary geopolitics.

Perhaps the most conspicuous legacy of the Empire is that of arbitrary border drawing. Operating in concert with their strategic propensity for ‘divide and rule’, British colonialists possessed an obsessive tendency to demarcate new borders as part of the process which has since been unduly termed ‘nation-building’. Contemporary maps are teeming with British markings of the colonial era. Asia, Africa and the Western-termed ‘Middle East’ were all subject to these ‘nation-building’ projects, under the guise of the British civilising mission.

Exercising their belief that the creation of nation states was the modus operandi for modern development, the British habitually tore apart villages and communities who were forced to reside on either side of these new illogical borders. Unsurprisingly, these procedures seldom drew upon the concerns of local and indigenous populations. Despite such claims of exporting ‘civilisation’ to their dominions, these cartographic processes in fact had very little to do with forming the foundations of a thriving or ‘developed’ nation. Rather, particularly in British India, it was a mechanism established to defend colonial frontiers and extend Britain’s economic opportunities across the region.

The defensive nature of the British Raj was partly a product of competing empires. While the British consolidated their rule across the Indian subcontinent, imperial Russia was making its way through Central Asia. The British became fixated with the ‘Great Game’ between themselves and the Russians. While the ‘Great Game’ has been doubted as a theory by some academics, there is little doubt that the British were fixated by the potential of Russian expanse, and that their border policies and creation of buffer zones along the Himalayas were dictated by these anxieties.

Imperial Intrigues

The Sino-Indian border is both long and complicated, and disputes such as the one in the Galwan Valley arise from the contested nature of the border. Such contestation partly results from obscurity on the part of British colonialists when it came to the demarcation of the borders between the British Raj and their Chinese neighbour.

The border regions which now comprise Aksai Chin/Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh have historically induced the greatest confrontations between India and China. A brief overview of colonial endeavours in the twentieth century affords a greater understanding of today’s relentless animosity between the two emerging powers in these strategic arenas.

The political sensitivity surrounding the border regions of Aksai Chin and Ladakh (Kashmir), where the recent outbreak in the Galwan Valley occurred, are a clear product of colonial cartography.

When the British overthrew the Sikh Empire in 1846, they acquired authority over the state of Jammu and Kashmir. As a part of the system of British Paramountcy, Jammu and Kashmir was handed over to the Hindu Dogras (who upheld a subsidiary rapport with the Raj). In 1865, a British official of the Survey of India, William Johnson, proposed a boundary termed the ‘Johnson Line’ (narcissism was not lacking colonial era – British officials had a tendency to name borders after those who administered their creation). 

Johnson’s boundary proposal placed the region of Aksai Chin inside Kashmir. At this moment, the Chinese had not yet defeated Turkestan nor gained control of modern-day Xinjiang, resulting in relatively minor interest over the status of Aksai Chin.

In the following decades, British officials proposed a number of revised versions of the boundary in Aksai Chin. Each modification, including the ‘Johnson-Ardagh Line’ of 1897, corresponded with the shifting international environment. The boundary was often contingent upon Russian manoeuvres and Chinese strength, following the ebbs and flows of the Great Game.

In 1899 came a new boundary proposal: this variation became known as the Macartney-Macdonald Line. By this point, China had annexed the border region of Xinjiang and thus had interests at stake in any border demarcation. Most importantly today, this new boundary proposal placed almost all of Aksai Chin in China. The boundary was never officialised by the Chinese government, who did not respond to the British note, but certainly functioned as the delimited border for a time. 

While the fluctuating boundary lines were partly an outcome of the changing international environment, and the respective strength of China and Russia at any given time, it also arose from the frequent disconnect between the British government in London and that in Delhi. 

In India and the China Crisis, Steven A. Hoffmann characterises this relationship as institutionalised, and a barrier to a coherent border policy. Officials on the ground in India often expressed their desires to expand the frontier as a mechanism for defence, but their colonial counterparts in London tended to express more caution on such matters (if the colonial era could ever be defined as cautious, that is). 

Disruption after Empire

In the decades preceding the demise of British rule in 1947, different maps contained different frontier boundaries. The ambiguity of this policymaking, and the equivocal borders that came with it, would severely disrupt the future processes of independence.

Both India and China subsequently laid claim to Aksai Chin. While India declared it historically a part of Ladakh (now a region in Indian-occupied Kashmir), China continue to adhere to a Macartney-MacDonald style boundary, which places Aksai Chin in their territorial bounds.

Although India and China have made efforts to ‘keep the peace’ on the border by signing a number of bilateral protocols, their governments have been unable to reach any consensus over the border. Rather, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) continues to operate as a de-facto boundary and does little to prevent transgressions from both sides. 

The eastern sect of the frontier has also induced numerous modern-day challenges: Arunachal Pradesh, India’s most north-eastern state, has been subjected to border eruptions between the Indian Army and the PLA. Until 1972, this territory was known as the North East Frontier Agency.

A peripheral region of the Raj, it was acknowledged by British officials as a potential colonial outpost, to act as a buffer region against any Russian advance. A further incentive was Britain’s imperial craving for access to the Tibetan trading port of Tawang, adding a fiscal benefit to their missions.

Hoping to secure colonial administration over this section of the Himalayan frontier, the British organised a conference to take between themselves and representatives from both China and Tibet. As this part of the border neighboured the then-contested region of Tibet, the British believed it wise to engage with both parties. At the 1913-14 conference, which became known as the Simla Convention, a common boundary was established. 

Aligning with China’s contemporary approach to their frontier peripheries, Chinese representatives rejected the Simla proposals on the grounds of sovereignty over Tibet. The Chinese Republic and Tibet at this time upheld a suzerain rapport, and there was a general concern amongst China’s officials that the British proposals brought these arrangements into question. 

However, to Britain’s advantage, Tibetan officials concurred. Discounting China’s refusal and pursuing negotiations in a covert fashion, both British and Tibetan officials signed other diplomatic agreements, including the demarcation of the McMahon Line. However, due to a number of complications, the McMahon Line did not appear on British maps until 20 years later, it would bear significance in the post-independence era.

Since the lapse of British rule, the Chinese government have consistently refused to accept the McMahon Line, claiming their absence in the clandestine arrangements dilutes its legitimacy. They further such statements by claiming Tibet was not an independent state and could not negotiate its borders. India, on the other hand, regard the Line as their de-jure border with China, and remain reluctant to make any territorial concessions. 

China’s crossing of the McMahon Line in 1962 sparked the only all-out war between India and China since the British departure from the subcontinent. Though efforts have been made to placate Sino-Indian hostilities, the eruption of tensions just west of the McMahon Line in recent weeks suggests peace is not to be taken for granted.

A Fragile Peace

When the British finally left the subcontinent, questions remained unanswered. Their colonial endeavours and undefined borders remain an obstacle to peace in contemporary Sino-Indian relations. The recent border clashes in the Galwan Valley are just one manifestation of the perpetual colonial legacy. Imperial imprints remain rampant across the region.

There is little doubt that India and China are implicated in the several challenges faced on the border today. Both governments have respectively exacerbated tensions and failed to listen to local indigenous demands, whilst politicking for regional hegemony. Notwithstanding the number of administrative complications which add to the rising levels of contemporary hostility, the current contention on the border cannot be viewed in isolation from Britain’s colonial missions. These missions were rushed and illogical, and only undertaken as a means of satisfying Britain’s imperialist hunger. 

Unsurprisingly, following their swift exit from the subcontinent, Britain have had little to say about the sheer number of disputes they left behind. Rather, it adopts a critical and superior voice when discussing the unrest across the world and Asia, failing to recognise the historical role we’ve played in the majority of these conflicts. 

Britain has recently reached a historical juncture when it comes to reckoning with our violent past. As Black Lives Matter movements occupy the streets, debates over colonial statues, inadequate curriculums and colonised institutions are dominating Britain’s political and educational discourse.

It is vital that these debates also acknowledge the role arbitrary border drawing played in determining today’s global challenges. Colonial implications are not something of the past. They are not simply a component of history. Rather, the legacy of Empire continues to shape the world as we know it.